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PLEADING PATTERNS  
AND THE ROLE OF LITIGATION  
AS A DRIVER OF FEDERAL CLIMATE 
CHANGE LEGISLATION 
 
Juscelino F. Colares and Kosta Ristovski∗ 
 
ABSTRACT: Based on a variant of the Elliott-Ackerman-Millian theory that variable, 
potentially inconsistent and costly litigation outcomes induce industry to seek federal 
preemptive legislation to reign in such costs, we collect data on climate change-related 
litigation to determine whether litigation might motivate major greenhouse gas emitters 
to accept a preemptive, though possibly carbon-restricting, legislative compromise. We 
conduct a spectral cluster analysis on 178 initial federal and state judicial filings to 
reveal the most relevant groupings among climate change-related suits and their 
underlying pleading patterns. Besides exposing the general content and structure of 
climate change-related filings, this study identifies major specific pleading trends, such 
as the low frequency of tort claim pleading and the high level of segregation of state 
and federal causes of action. These data also allow investigating how generally 
applicable litigation doctrines have influenced pleading patterns, even subduing the 
impact of the two major U.S. Supreme Court rulings in this area. These findings lead us 
to conclude that this type of litigation has not induced, and is not likely to induce, 
major emitters to embrace preemptive emissions legislation as a risk-reducing 
compromise.  
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 Not unlike prior episodes of corporate opposition to regulatory action (for 
example, resistance to lead, asbestos, tobacco controls, and so forth), corporate 
lobbying against federal climate legislation has worked to undermine climate 
change mitigation efforts.1 Although one should be careful not to overrate the 
role of lobbying expenditures or discount that of ideology in blocking passage 
of emission abatement legislation,2 it is quite clear that such blockage has led 
to delayed action under otherwise suboptimal policy.3 Yet, a strategy that 
relies solely on legislative blockage may be of limited efficacy when climate 
change-related storm surges, coastal erosion, landslides, and other ancillary 
harms become more frequent and severe. Harmed individuals, businesses, and 
local and state governments may resort to litigation against the biggest green-
house gas (GHG) emitters.  
Litigation stakes and risks only rise further when one considers that 
common insurance policies, such as commercial general liability (CGL), may 
not cover defense or indemnity claims for climate change-related damages. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia recently held in AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. 
Co. that an insurer is not obligated to provide coverage to an insured defending 
a climate change-related nuisance claim where the alleged damages “were the 
natural and probable consequences of [the insured’s] intentional emissions.”4 
AES, the insured power company and declaratory judgment defendant, was 
also one the defendants in a contemporaneous federal case filed by a native 
Alaskan village, Kivalina, located on an Alaskan barrier island.5 In that suit, 
the governing bodies of an Inupiat Eskimo village sought federal and state 
common law damages in federal court for various climate change-related 
harms, including erosion and uninhabitable conditions caused by rising sea 
                                                                                                                                  
  1. See, e.g., Juscelino F. Colares, Paths to Carbon Stabilization: How Foreign Carbon-
Restricting Reforms Will Affect US Industry, Climate Policy and the Prospects of a Binding Emis-
sion Reduction Treaty, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 281, 292–98 (2013) (quantifying corporate lobbying 
the last time the U.S. Congress considered broad climate change legislation and positing that 
lobbying by some companies that publicly supported carbon-restricting legislation may have been 
public relations-motivated when their top officials sat in boards of trade groups that were lobbying 
contemporaneously against the bill); UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, A CLIMATE OF 
CORPORATE CONTROL: HOW CORPORATIONS HAVE INFLUENCED THE U.S. DIALOGUE ON 
CLIMATE SCIENCE AND POLICY (2012), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/ 
scientific_integrity/a-climate-of-corporate-control-report.pdf (providing empirical evidence of cor-
porate feigned support for climate action and pointing to evidence of a concerted effort toward 
generating favorable public opinion).  
  2. See Colares, supra note 1, at 298 (describing the significant role ideology played in the 
failure of the 2009 climate bill).  
  3. In fact, once some threshold level of GHG concentrations is exceeded, delayed action 
likely increases marginal abatement costs and economic losses. See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, Policy 
Instruments for Climate Change: How Can National Governments Address a Global Problem?, 
1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 293, 314 (citing William D. Nordhaus, The Cost of Slowing Climate 
Changes: A Survey, 12 ENERGY J. 37, 61–63 (1991)). Moreover, the inexistence of a strong price 
signal for emissions in current federal law—whether through a carbon tax or cap-and-trade 
scheme—only exacerbates the suboptimality of pursuing carbon-restrictive action in the absence 
of a binding global emissions reduction treaty. 
  4. 725 S.E.2d 532, 620 (Va. 2012). 
  5. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (N.D. Cal. 
2009). 
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levels and increasing coastal waves and surges.6 Once impleaded, Steadfast, 
the insurer, provided AES litigation coverage, but only “under a reservation of 
rights,” and filed for declaratory judgment action in Virginia state court, 
claiming that “it did not owe AES a defense or indemnity coverage for damage 
allegedly caused by AES’s contribution to global warming . . . .”7  
In the state court action, Steadfast’s major argument was that its policy 
covered property damage only arising from an “occurrence.”8  The court 
explained that state courts had construed “occurrence,” under Virginia law, to 
mean harm that is objectively unforeseeable, not harm that is the foreseeable 
result of intentional conduct.9 Because the Kivalina plaintiffs alleged that 
“AES intentionally released carbon dioxide into the atmosphere as a regular 
part of its energy-producing activities,” and their complaint stated that “there 
is a clear scientific consensus that the natural and probable consequence of 
such emissions is global warming and damages such as Kivalina suffered,” the 
court concluded, “the natural or probable consequence of that intentional act is 
not an accident under Virginia law.”10 Simply put, AES and other similarly 
situated GHG emitters can no longer rely on traditional CGL policies to 
manage their litigation risks.  
 As the anthropogenic causes of climate change11 gain wider policymaker 
and public recognition, and climate change effects materialize,12 major GHG 
emitters are likely to find themselves the target of lawsuits for their intentional 
emissions just as their conduct falls outside the scope of ordinary, accident-
focused insurance policies. Of course, new insurance products that provide 
broader climate change-related risk coverage are in the works. These products 
should help managing risk, but only at the cost of higher premia: insurance 
                                                                                                                                  
  6. Id. at 868. The Kivalina plaintiffs, appearing later as petitioners, alleged the absence of 
timely relief under the Clean Air Act (CAA) justified their request for relief under federal com-
mon law. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 16, Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 
133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013) (No. 12-1072). 
  7. AES Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 725 S.E.2d 532, 533 (2012). 
  8. Id. at 534.  
  9. See id. at 538. 
  10. Id. at 536–37. 
  11. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 10 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at http:// 
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4_wg1_full_report.pdf (“Most of the observed 
increase in globally averaged temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely [that is, 90–
95% likely] due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations.”).  
  12. A recent study shows that the climate change-related sea level rise from 1950 to 2012 
exacerbated the “extreme-event inundation” and economic losses in the area affected by Hurricane 
Sandy’s “abnormal” westward strike heading, and suggested that “events of less and less severity 
(from less powerful storms) will produce similar events.” See William Sweet et al., Hurricane 
Sandy Inundation Probabilities Today and Tomorrow, in EXPLAINING EXTREME EVENTS OF 2012 
FROM A CLIMATE PERSPECTIVE, 94.9 BULL. AMER. METEOR. SOC. S17, S18–20 (2013), available 
at http://www.ametsoc.org/2012extremeeventsclimate.pdf (citation omitted). But see, e.g., Elisabeth 
A. Barnes et al., Model Projections of Atmospheric Steering of Sandy-Like Superstorms, 110 
PNAS 15211, 15211 (2013) (forecasting “a decrease in the frequency and persistence of the 
westward flow that led to Sandy’s unprecedented track, implying that future atmospheric condi-
tions are less likely than at present to propel storms westwards into the coast”).  
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risk analysts are connecting growing GHG concentrations with the increasing 
frequency and cost of climate change-related events.13  
 This article seeks to explain the structure of climate change-related litiga-
tion to determine whether litigation can induce emitter support for federal 
preemptive, though possibly carbon-restricting, legislation. Relying on a var-
iant of the Elliott-Ackerman-Millian (EAM) theory that the imposition of 
variable, potentially inconsistent and more costly litigation outcomes induces 
industry to seek preemptive federal legislation to reign in such costs,14 we 
examine whether the risk associated with diffuse litigation in state and federal 
courts—rather than inconsistent state regulations, as in the original theory—
might motivate major GHG emitters to embrace preemptive emissions legisla-
tion as a risk-reducing compromise.  
Because emitting industries take their cues from the evolving litigation 
environment, a catastrophic litigation loss need not occur before emitters 
abandon their aversion to legislation in response to an increase in perceived 
risk. Rising trends in litigation, if accompanied by industry-impacting 
injunctions and debilitating damages, would impose the kind of forward-
looking risk on major GHG emitters that might justify a change in strategy.15 
By contrast, a low volume of complaints that are not likely to produce such 
damaging, industry-wide outcomes may be no more than a nuisance that can 
be absorbed as the cost of conducting business as usual, thus leading to a 
refutation of our modified EAM theory. Thus, understanding the current 
structure and levels of climate change-related litigation is critical to 
determining where the potential sources of litigation risk lie and whether they 
may become substantial enough to change major GHG emitters’ distaste for 
carbon-restricting legislation.  
Part I provides a brief introduction to climate change-related civil 
litigation and develops a strategy for obtaining relevant information from 
initial complaints and appellate briefs filed before state and federal courts from 
1990 to 2013. Data collected on causes of action pled in each of 178 original 
judicial filings (that is, original complaints and appellate briefs) allow us to 
perform a cluster analysis. Besides revealing the general structure of climate 
                                                                                                                                  
  13. See, e.g., CHASING ICE (Diamond Docs et al. 2012) (“[O]ur activities, primarily [GHG] 
emissions are already contributing to more intense and more events—it cannot be explained by 
just better reporting, it has to be explained by changes in the atmospheric conditions.” (according 
to Peter Hoeppe, Head of Geo Risks Research, Munich Reinsurance)); Evan Mills, The Role of 
U.S. Insurance Regulators in Responding to Climate Change, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLICY 
129, 132 (2007) (positing that “rising weather-related losses are expected [and] will have adverse 
impacts on insurance affordability and availability”).  
  14. See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization 
of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG. 313–40 (1985). Elliott and his coauthors were inter-
ested in solving the puzzle created by the wave of environmental statutes approved in the 1965–
1970 period, when the environmental movement was “not yet well-organized as a conventional 
interest group in Washington,” which “seem[ed] to contradict the usual wisdom that statutes are 
passed in response to political activity by well-organized pressure groups.” Id. at 313. “Preemptive 
federalization” was one of the theories the triad proposed.  
  15. For an example of how litigation can have a deep impact on an entire industry, see 
ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., Tobacco Litigation, in REGULATION BY LITIGATION, 126–59 (2009).  
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change-related filings, these data also help us detect some specific, major 
pleading trends, such as the low frequency of tort claim pleading, and the high 
level of segregation of state and federal causes of action in suits brought in this 
area (Part II). We take further advantage of these rich data to test a few 
hypotheses, including whether the displacement of federal common law claims 
in AEP v. Connecticut16 has led to an increase in the number of state law-based 
causes of action raised in more recent complaints (Part III). Although 
preliminary tests reveal that plaintiffs seem to be adjusting to AEP by pleading 
more state law-based causes of action, we anticipate standing and state law 
preemption challenges will become harder to overcome as the scope and pace 
of EPA’s regulatory work under the existing CAA structure increases. Because 
neither state or federal litigation is likely to produce levels of legal uncertainty 
or catastrophic liability risk strong enough to persuade major GHG emitters to 
shift in favor federal preemptive legislation, we rule out our “litigation qua 
preemptive federalization” thesis (Part IV). Thus, notwithstanding the liberal 
pleading philosophy in the United States, generally applicable litigation 
doctrines are likely to continue restricting climate change pleading, even 
subduing the impact of major U.S. Supreme Court rulings in this area.  
I. CLIMATE CHANGE-RELATED LITIGATION 
A. Overview 
 To date, climate change-related litigation does not appear to have been 
more than a minor “nuisance” to major GHG emitters. Federal common law 
nuisance suits have been infrequent, and plaintiffs in the only four reported 
cases have not had any success.17 Cases pursuing different causes of action 
have been dismissed on threshold grounds (for example, standing, displace-
ment, and political question).18 While displacement of federal common law 
                                                                                                                                  
  16. See AEP v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (holding that the CAA and the 
EPA action under the Act’s authorization displaces any federal right to seek CO2 emission-based 
nuisance abatement from stationary sources).  
  17. AEP v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (holding that the CAA and the EPA 
action under the Act’s authorization displaces any federal right to seek CO2 emission-based nui-
sance abatement from stationary sources); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Co., 696 F.3d 
849, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes 
displace federal common law causes of action as well as any federal damage remedy asserted for 
harm caused by past GHG emissions), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013) (No. 12-1072); People 
of State of California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *13 (N.D. 
Cal. Sep. 17, 2007) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on nonjustici-
able, political question grounds); Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 859(NRB), 2005 WL 2414744, at 
*2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2005) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss because plaintiff’s alleged 
injuries were too hypothetical and speculative to confer standing).  
  18. See, e.g., Amigos Bravos v. BLM, 816 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1128–29 (D.N.M. 2011) (hold-
ing that plaintiffs failed to establish standing because there was no scientific evidence that climate 
change would lead to the kinds of harms alleged or that climate change created an imminent threat 
of harm); Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding that 
the plaintiff did not suffer a distinct injury for standing purposes from the defendant’s failure to 
comply with NEPA); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 480 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that one of plaintiff’s claims was not ripe for review because approval of 
a lease for offshore drilling had not reached the “critical stage where an irreversible and irretrieva-
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claims remains a serious obstacle to nuisance claims, alternative climate 
change-related causes of action under existing federal environmental statutes 
and under state law remain open to willing plaintiffs.19 The recent Kivalina 
decision reiterated this point. While the Ninth Circuit focused its ruling on 
federal issues (that is, separation of powers, displacement of federal common 
law and the applicability of displacement regardless of the type of remedy 
asserted),20 it recognized plaintiffs’ right to pursue their state law-based claims 
in state court, which the district court had dismissed.21  
Yet when plaintiffs have reached the merits, generally they have not been 
successful.22 As of this writing, one major exception stands out: in Friends of 
the Earth et al. v. Mosbacher, a group of environmental activists and cities 
sued two U.S. agencies for funding and insuring fossil fuel projects without 
considering their environmental impacts, which they claimed constituted a 
violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 23  Plaintiffs 
charged that Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and Export-
Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank) loans as well as other financial 
“assistance for fossil fuel projects . . . will result in . . . emissions equivalent to 
                                                                                                                                  
ble commitment of resources ha[d] occurred”); Comer v. Murphy Oil, 839 F.Supp.2d 849, 864 
(S.D. Miss. 2012) (holding that the political question doctrine precludes the court from making 
determinations regarding the reasonableness of the CO2 emissions and that that such determina-
tions should be left to the EPA, the delegated agency). 
  19. However, these claims and related remedies remain open to plaintiffs only to the extent 
they are “not preempted by federal law.” See AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (citing and quoting Int’l 
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 489, 491, 497 (1987) (holding that the Clean Water Act does 
not preclude aggrieved individuals from bringing a “nuisance claim pursuant to the law of 
the source State”) (emphasis on the original).  
  20. See Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 856–57.  
  21. Id. at 866 (Pro, J., concurring) (“Kivalina may pursue whatever remedies it may have 
under state law to the extent their claims are not preempted.”).  
  22. See, e.g., Peters v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 11S002156, 2012 WL 1654112, at 
*1, *2 (Cal. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2012) (holding that a vehicle producer is not obligated to compensate 
vehicle purchasers for reliance on incorrect fuel economy ratings); League of Wilderness Defend-
ers-Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Martin, No. 2:10-CV-1346-BR, 2011 WL 2493765, at 
*1–11 (D. Or. June 23, 2011) (deferring to the U.S. Forest Service’s discretion in determining 
whether to prepare an environmental assessment as opposed to an environmental impact statement 
to address the potential impacts of climate change); Okeson v. City of Seattle, 78 P.3d 1279 
(Wash. 2003) (holding that utility ratepayers are not obligated to bear the costs of climate change-
related harms and other maintenance expenses from the use of electricity for public streetlights); 
Seattle Audubon Soc’y. v. Lyons, 871 F.Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (upholding defendant’s 
regulatory compliance defense and explaining that should be the case even where, as plaintiff 
alleged, compliance was inadequate to appropriately combat the harmful effects of climate 
change); City of Los Angeles v. NHTSA, 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that, while the 
plaintiffs had standing, the defendant’s decision to refrain from preparing environmental impact 
statements did not conflict with the relevant law).  
  23. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The 
challenged agencies were the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Export-
Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im Bank). Other settlements include the Tennessee Valley 
Authority Clean Air Act Settlement, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www2. 
epa.gov/enforcement/tennessee-valley-authority-clean-air-act-settlement (outlining the settlement 
agreement requiring defendant agency to invest in clean energy projects).  
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almost two-thirds of U.S. annual” GHG emissions.24 After the district court 
denied cross-motions for summary judgment,25 the parties reached a settlement 
that required each agency to offer at least $250 million in financing for 
renewable energy projects for a period of ten years.26  
 At first glance, litigation volume appears rather low in the climate change 
area. Yet, frequency of litigation can be a poor proxy for litigation risk, partic-
ularly if one considers how a single major legal development may affect a 
defendant’s expected liability.27 Corporate boardrooms have probably not 
forgotten the fast turn of events leading to the tobacco settlement following the 
Supreme Court decision in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.28 A breakthrough 
on preemption doctrine, Cipollone’s displacement of federal common law suits 
led to state attorneys general’s healthcare-cost-reimbursement suits against the 
tobacco companies and their subsequent catastrophic loss, known as the to-
bacco settlement.29 As in Cipollone, the displacement of federal common law 
remedies in AEP is hardly the death knell for state common law claims re-
sulting from climate change effects associated with GHG emissions. However, 
while major GHG emitters may have reason to anticipate a rise in state law-
based claim pleading, the unequivocal federal occupation of this area, illus-
trated by the incremental growth in the climate change regulatory framework 
                                                                                                                                  
  24. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Second Amended) at 2, Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 3-02CV04106). 
  25. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 920.  
  26. See, e.g., LISE JOHNSON, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION 
THROUGH INSURANCE FOR OVERSEAS INVESTMENTS: THE EXAMPLE OF THE U.S. OVERSEAS 
PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION (OPIC) 7–8 (2012), available at http://www.iisd.org/ 
sites/default/files/pdf/2012/opic_agriculture_mitigation.pdf (describing the settlement agreement 
between Friends of the Earth and OPIC); Settlement Agreement Export-Import Bank of the United 
States Ex. A, at § 4a(1)(b), Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. 
Cal. 2007) (No. 3-02CV04106), ECF No. 217-1 (outlining the February 6, 2009 settlement agree-
ment between Friends of the Earth and Ex-Im Bank). The federal district court dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice pursuant to the settlement agreement. Order for Dismissal with Preju-
dice, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Mosbacher, 488 F. Supp. 2d 889 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (No. 3-
02CV04106), ECF No. 217. There have been other, though much less prominent, exceptions. See 
Negotiated Resolution of Consolidated Civil Action, Coal. for Envtl. Integrity in Yucca Valley v. 
Town of Yucca Valley, No. CIVSS 810232 (San Bernardino Co. Sup. Ct. Mar. 4, 2010) (outlining 
the settlement agreement requiring defendant to take additional GHG mitigation measures); Order 
regarding Settlement at 2–3, California v. San Bernardino County, No. CIVSS 0700329 (San 
Bernardino Co. Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 2007) (approving settlement agreement that required San Ber-
nardino County to identify GHG emissions resulting from city plans, evaluate the effect of these 
GHG emissions on climate change and mitigate the effects of anticipated GHG emissions); Nw 
Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Owens Corning Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Or. 2006) (preceding a subse-
quent settlement requiring defendants to abstain from emission of harmful GHGs).  
  27. Of course, a defendant’s litigation risk is also affected by potential plaintiffs’ expected 
litigation value, which, in turn, is a function of their expected pecuniary returns and perceived 
stake in a dispute. See Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis: 
Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92, S93–94 (1997).  
  28. 505 U.S. 504, 511 (1992).  
  29. See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 
2054–55 (1999) (stating that “the opinion was so closely tied to the particular statute under consid-
eration [that is, the Federal Labeling Act] that no generalizable preemption principles could be 
gleaned from its language.”).  
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(for example, EPA establishment of emission, fuel economy and performance 
standards, and so forth),30 leaves doubts about the extent to which state law 
can significantly increase those risks. Moreover, risk associated with a grow-
ing number of state-based claims is likely to be diminished because of formi-
dable standing challenges facing such plaintiffs, a topic we discuss in Part 
II.A.31  
 In sum, the generally applicable doctrines of standing, federal common 
law displacement and state law preemption, among other threshold defenses, 
give major GHG emitters some peace of mind as far as litigation risk is con-
cerned. Although an expanding regulatory framework may increase costs to 
these entities (including the cost associated with fighting such regulations), the 
litigation risk associated with regulatory suits is small relative to the risk from 
suits for imminent destruction of property due to climate change effects, as in 
Kivalina. Litigation over regulatory compliance is certainly much narrower, 
involving, typically, more focused inquiry into defendants’ compliance with 
prewritten rules rather than adherence to abstract liability standards, which can 
become unwieldy for corporate defendants.32 Arguably, a rise in riskier tort 
litigation would induce such defendants to be more favorable towards reform, 
and would increase the political prospects of federal climate legislation. Theo-
                                                                                                                                  
  30. See, e.g., Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases under 
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. ch.1) (EPA’s original Endangerment Finding under the CAA); Reconsideration of Interpre-
tation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting Programs, 
75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50, 51, 70, and 71) (Timing 
Rule); Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel 
Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 531, 533, 
536, 537, and 538) (Tailpipe Rule); Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Green-
house Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51, 
52, 70, and 71) (Tailoring Rule); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Stand-
ards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 85, 86, 600, 1033, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1065, 1066, and 1068; and 49 
CFR pt. 523, 534, and 535); Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas Emissions for New 
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (proposed Apr. 13, 
2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60) (“proposed ‘new source performance standards’ (NSPS) 
rule” for new fossil-fuel-fired power plants rated at more than 24 megawatts); Oil and Natural Gas 
Sector: New Source Performance Standards and National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants Reviews, 77 Fed. Reg. 49,490 (Aug. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60, 
and 63) (new rules that regulate volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions from gas wells and 
storage vessels, including leaking components at onshore natural and shale gas processing plants 
and that will go into effect in 2015). 
  31. Specifically, the traceability (that is, causation) prong remains the major hurdle for 
climate change plaintiffs.  
  32. Of course, regulatory claims can be brought together with tort claims, and regulatory 
compliance alone may not shield corporate defendants from tort-based theories of liability. See 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4 cmt. e (1997) (“standards set by most product 
safety statutes or regulations generally are only minimum standards” that “leave open the question 
of whether a higher standard of product safety should be applied.”). Yet, not infrequently, courts 
find compliance with “a particular product standard set by statute or regulation” to be conclusive 
against tort liability where the standard at issue “adequately serves the objectives of tort law . . . .” 
Id.  
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retical musings aside, what data did we use to study climate change-related 
litigation and what did such data reveal?  
B. Causes of Action and Pleading 
To study this area of litigation, we chose causes of action as our unit of 
analysis. Before explaining the methodological reasons for this choice, we first 
note that the term “cause of action” is a term of art meant to loosely describe 
“the ‘legal theory,’ or substantive right” associated with a grouping of facts 
that a plaintiff alleges as the basis for her request for legal relief.33 Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned against broad, sweeping use of the term 
“unrelated to the function which [sic] the concept serves in a particular situa-
tion,”34 our use of the term is uncontroversial. Because we are not concerned 
with the scope of issue or claim preclusion—where a broad construction of 
“cause of action” or factual groupings can lead to preclusive effects—we are 
comfortable with using cause of action interchangeably with “claim,” as the 
latter term is used throughout Rules 8 and 18 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Federal Rules), to liberally designate a plea for relief grounded on 
facts that call for the application of a legal theory.  
 Due to the Federal Rules’ liberal provision for joinder of multiple claims 
under Rules 8 and 18, federal judges’ high threshold for applying Rule 11 
sanctions and res judicata principles, plaintiffs have traditionally had strong 
incentives to plead as many causes of action as they deem fit. The same incen-
tives appear in the procedural law of many states, which, under the influence 
of the Second Restatement of Judgments’ transactional approach, induces 
plaintiffs to plead broadly and avoid splitting claims, because it may result in 
preclusion. The only major long-term check on state plaintiffs’ pleading crea-
tivity has been the federal removal statute.35 This statute allows defendants to 
remove suits containing causes of action arising under federal law, also allow-
ing out-of-state defendants to remove suits containing state law-based causes 
of action that satisfy federal diversity jurisdiction.36 The upshot is that removal 
dampens state court plaintiffs’ interest in pleading some causes of action—
particularly those within the original jurisdiction of federal courts—and join-
ing out-of-state defendants. That plaintiffs’ win rate in removed cases is lower 
than their win rate in state court cases (and even cases originating in federal 
court) illustrates how removal diminishes plaintiffs’ forum advantage.37 Argu-
                                                                                                                                  
  33. See RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 
46 (10th ed. 2010).  
  34. United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947) (emphasis added) (citation and 
quotation omitted).  
  35. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(b) (2011).  
  36. Note that claims not within the original or supplemental jurisdiction of the federal courts 
must be remanded upon removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(2) (2011).  
  37. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything about the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 
593–94 tbl.1, 597–606 (1998) (indicating that the win rate in original diversity cases is 71 percent, 
but for removed diversity cases is only 34 percent, and demonstrating, through several regressions, 
that, while case selection influences this result, removal does have a direct effect on outcomes).  
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ably, this would motivate plaintiffs to plead more carefully and occasionally 
reduce the number of causes of actions in a complaint. 
 Besides removal, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision on pleading stand-
ards has likely suppressed plaintiffs’ selection of causes of action for litigation 
and thus possibly affected the number of causes of action we detect in our 
study. After a succession of lower federal court rulings that tightened pleading 
requirements,38 the Court, in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, upheld dismissal on a 
preanswer Rule 12(b)(6) motion of plaintiffs’ allegations of parallel conduct in 
support of illegal conspiracy claims in violation of antitrust laws. The Court 
held that plaintiffs’ conclusory factual assertions of parallel conduct, though 
conceivable, lacked the factual detail to make their conspiracy allegations 
“plausible” and thus did not meet the Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard.39 While 
five-decade-old Supreme Court precedent interpreting Rule 8(a)(2)’s “short 
and plain statement of the claim” language adopted the conception of bare 
bones “notice pleading,”40 Twombly effectively created a new standard that 
requires “testing factual strength at the pleading stage,” to determine a com-
plaint’s “convincingness.”41 This new, more searching test has likely sup-
pressed a number of causes of action that would survive the prior standard.42 
In a recent study that used cause-of-action level data obtained from complaints 
filed in federal courts, Christina Boyd and her coauthors detected a net reduc-
tion in the number of causes of action pled in civil complaints.43 Whether 
                                                                                                                                  
  38. See, e.g., Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 
1003–04 n. 114 (2003) (citing Goad v. Mitchell, 297 F.3d 497, 504 (6th Cir. 2002) and Judge v. 
City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 74 (1st Cir. 1998) as examples of appellate court decisions requiring 
“a plaintiff to plead—pre-discovery—specific facts concerning the defendant’s state of mind 
irrespective of Rule 9(b), which allows state of mind to be alleged generally.”). But see, e.g., 
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514–15 (2002) (holding unanimously that Rule 
8(a)(2)’s notice standard does not require a complaint to provide particularized fact-based allega-
tions in support of an employment discrimination claim). Note that as late as Sorema, the Court 
had indicated that requiring greater factual specificity at the pleading stage would have to come 
“by amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.” See id. at 515 (citations 
omitted).  
  39. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). To clear out remaining 
doubts about the general applicability of Twombly, the Court expressly held two years later that 
“Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions,’ and it applies to antitrust and 
discrimination suits alike.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted).  
  40. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957) (explaining that “all the Rules require 
is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests . . .” and that “[s]uch simplified ‘notice 
pleading’ is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial proce-
dures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and 
to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues.”) (citations omitted).  
  41. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 33, at 43.  
  42. For a critical approach to Twombly’s heightened pleading standard and careful theoret-
ical analysis of its likely claim-suppressing effect on pleading and repercussions regarding motion 
practice see Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010).  
  43. Christina Boyd et al., Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in 
Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 253, 273–74 (2013). Boyd and her coauthors 
worked with a large sample of complaints containing causes of action in 19 diverse issue areas. Id. 
at 260.  
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Twombly has caused plaintiffs in climate change-related suits to plead fewer 
causes of action will be discussed in Part III.B, when we examine the impact 
of two major U.S. Supreme Court decisions on plaintiffs’ selection of causes 
of action in climate change-related complaints. With these preliminary com-
ments on pleading and the concept of cause of action in mind, we now explain 
how we compiled data on causes of action from complaints filed in state and 
federal courts.  
C. Data and Methodology 
1. The Data 
 To obtain information regarding litigation involving climate change-
related issues, we conducted some initial prospective searches in Westlaw for 
complaints and decisions involving climate change-related disputes. Although 
we wanted to focus only on cases where climate change issues were relevant 
and material to the pleadings and final outcomes of litigation, we started by 
conducting searches that were broad enough to capture all well-known 
“climate change” complaints and opinions (for example, Massachusetts v. 
EPA, Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., Connecticut v. AEP, Kivalina v. Exxon, 
and so forth), but not so broad as to capture an unmanageable amount of cases 
where terms, such as climate change, were merely incidental or used to refer to 
the broader legal concepts discussed in those famous cases. 
 For this study, “relevant” climate change-related complaints or opinions 
occur where plaintiffs raise one or more causes of action arising under either 
statutory, regulatory or common law that, under the facts alleged, could lead to 
judicial relief (for example, injunctive, declaratory, and compensatory) associ-
ated with climate change or its effects. Furthermore, because the object of this 
study is to determine whether a rise in litigation risk will affect GHG emitters’ 
interest in federal legislation, we discarded cases where the latter challenged 
environmental statutes and regulations. In these industry-initiated cases,44 a 
win would decrease GHG emitters’ present or projected costs, which is the 
opposite of what this study attempts to gauge.45 In sum, we only collected 
complaints that raise GHG emitters’ litigation risk ex ante. We did so because, 
under our modified EAM theory, only risk-increasing adjudication (among all 
climate change-related adjudication), with its possibility of creating variable 
                                                                                                                                  
  44. In some of these excluded cases, plaintiffs can be industry-sympathetic state govern-
ments, small government supporters and industry groups, such as the National Association of 
Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. See, e.g., Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 
Inc. v. EPA, Nos. 09-1322 et al., 2010 WL 5509187 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 10, 2010) (per curiam) (deny-
ing and granting different motions made by plaintiffs who challenged EPA’s 2009 Endangerment 
Finding). Although this particular rule did not itself increase costs for GHG emitters, it was the 
necessary precursor to regulations that, once finalized, would. See sources cited supra note 30. 
Therefore, because this type of filing was an attempt to reduce GHG emitters’ costs, we did not 
include it in our dataset.  
  45. For a prior empirical discussion of general outcomes in climate change cases regardless 
of their risk implication for major GHG emitters, see David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical 
Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012). 
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and potentially inconsistent standards, could alter major GHG emitters’ struc-
ture of incentives, leading them to choose preemptive, though possibly carbon-
restricting, legislation over costly and inconsistent litigation.  
Thus defined, we began collecting data on climate change-related litiga-
tion (complaints and judicial opinions) that occurred from January 1, 1990 to 
June 30, 2013. After fine-tuning earlier overinclusive searches and witnessing 
some gaps in the available databases, we settled on the following strategy: (1) 
searching for judicial opinions;46 (2) determining and coding the relevant opin-
ions; (3) using the opinions to find as many initial judicial filings as possible 
(for example, original complaints filed in courts of first resort and original 
briefs filed in appellate courts following initial administrative proceedings);47 
and (4) realizing that opinions are only a subset of the larger population of 
complaints, undertaking an exclusively complaint-focused search (that is, 
regardless of the occurrence of any case disposition).48 The goal was also to 
extract information (for example, types, frequency, co-occurrence of causes of 
action pleaded, and dates of initial filings) embedded in the universe of climate 
change-related civil complaints, which is not fully reflected in judicial opin-
ions, the latter representing only the filtered accounts of adjudication.49 Fur-
thermore, obtaining complaint data would be helpful in restricting case 
selection effects from tainting future analysis of case outcomes (the topic of a 
subsequent study), with the added advantage of giving us the best possible 
                                                                                                                                  
  46. This opinion-focused search, conducted in WestlawNext, targeted cases with at least one 
disposition or opinion. It contained the following terms: “g.h.g. (greenhouse /3 gas /3 emi!) 
(chang! /3 climate) (“global warming”) & DA(aft 12-31-1989) % industry.” An overinclusive 
original effort, this search produced 609 cases. After weeding out irrelevant disputes we obtained 
126 opinions. Cross-referencing the results of this search with an available online database main-
tained by Michael B. Gerrard, Senior Counsel, Arnold & Porter, LLP (New York, NY), we de-
tected 18 missing opinions, which were then included in the database. Gerrard’s database is 
available at http://climatecasechart.com. In contrast, this opinion-based search detected 12 relevant 
opinions that do not appear in Gerrard’s database. A subsequent complaint-based search (see step 
(iv)) would produce 12 additional opinions, bringing the opinion total to 156.  
  47. We obtained these original filings (hereinafter broadly referred to as “complaints”) from 
the opinions detected by clicking on the “Filings” tab in WestlawNext. As empirical legal re-
searchers are aware, Westlaw has many but not all original complaints. We located a few missing 
complaints by using Bloomberg Law’s “Search Dockets” feature in the “Litigation and Dockets” 
tab.  
  48. This complaint-focused search was conducted in WestlawNext and contained the follow-
ing terms: “g.h.g. (greenhouse /3 gas /3 emi!) (chang! /3 climate) (“global warming”) & (“envi-
ronmental law”) & DA(aft 12-31-1989).” This search contained 169 entries, which yielded about 
110 relevant complaints, 24 of which had not appeared in previous opinion-focused searches and 
databases. In addition, this search led to the discovery of 12 new relevant opinions. See supra note 
46. When appellate briefs were the original judicial filing of interest, we chose not to search for 
the original agency petitions due to the limited and inconsistent availability of such filings in 
electronic databases.  
  49. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 119, 138 (2002) (explaining how win-rate data generated from judicial opinions “reveals 
little about the underlying, variegated mass of disputes and cases.”). See generally George L. 
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) 
(explaining how doctrinal information focused only on case outcomes discloses little about how 
legal rules affect behavior or affect the generation of legal disputes). 
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estimate of currently pending or inactive climate change-related cases in the 
state and federal court systems. 
To account for mismatches between opinions without complaints and 
complaints without opinions and fill occasional gaps in the Westlaw and 
Bloomberg Law databases, we turned to PACER (for federal cases), different 
state court databases, and, as a last resort, environmental nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), corporate or government defendants, and original 
plaintiffs’ attorneys.50 Throughout this exercise, the goal was to obtain the 
population of relevant climate change-related complaints and available opin-
ions. After collection and coding, we have 178 of 182 total detected com-
plaints. Table 1 summarizes the complaints we found. 
 





Number of Observations 
 
                   Fully Coded 
 
178 
                   Not Fully Coded    4 
 





While we are very confident that this mixed strategy captured the entire pop-
ulation of relevant climate change-related original judicial filings, it is possible 
we missed an occasional complaint. A few undetected complaints are not 
likely to change the overall composition of the data nor the conclusions 
reached regarding the status and structure of climate change-related litigation.  
2. Coding Causes of Action in Complaints 
After cataloging all state and federal complaints, we coded the causes of 
action for each complaint. To conduct spectral cluster analysis and hypothesis 
testing, we developed the following cause of action extraction protocol. For 
each complaint, we identified causes of action based on the claims or counts 
plaintiffs alleged. We excluded pure request for remedies, such as attorneys’ 
fees, damages, declaratory judgment or injunctions, commonly phrased as 
separate “counts,” “claims” or expressly “causes of action,” to ensure we only 
captured substantive causes of action. Although we had some preexisting 
expectations regarding the main categories of causes of action based on our 
familiarity with pleading practice in this field, the final list of categories 
                                                                                                                                  
  50. For the seven complaints we knew were missing but could not obtain electronically, we 
contacted attorneys and asked for their original filings. The authors thank James P. Peters, Esq. 
(Glenwood, MN) (one complaint) and John McClendon, Esq. (Laguna Hills, CA) (two com-
plaints) for kindly responding to our requests and sending us electronic copies of the complaints 
they filed on behalf of their plaintiff clients. As of this writing, four requests remain unanswered.  
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remained open until we coded the last complaint. Thus, out of 178 complaints 
coded, we extracted 360 individual causes of action, which we classified under 
21 general categories. Table 2 lists these categories, and the two columns on 
the right provide their percentages and frequencies: 
 













F. Ag. Reg. 
 
Bureau of Land Management Regulations, 
Fish & Wildlife Service Regulations 
 
        1.39% 
 
  5 
F. APA N/A       13.06% 47 
F. CAA N/A         4.44% 16 
F. CWA N/A         1.67%   6 
F. ESA N/A         9.44% 34 
FLMPA N/A         2.78% 10 
F. FOIA N/A         1.39%   5 
F. NEPA N/A       19.44% 70 
F. NHPA N/A         1.94%   7 
F. NFMA N/A         1.94%   7 
F. Tort Nuisance         1.11%   4 
Other F. Non-Reg. 5th & 14th Amendment Due Process, 
Exec. Encroachment on Legislative Au-
thority, Equal Protection Clause, Civil 
Action for Deprivation of Rights, RICO, 
Civil Conspiracy, Concert of Action 
        1.67%   6 
Other F. Reg. Transportation Act, Energy Policy Act, 
Misc. F. Conservation Statutes 
        6.11% 22 
S. Adm. Proc. N/A         1.67%   6 
S. NEPA N/A       16.94% 61 
S. Tort Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Nuisance, 
Trespass 
        1.94%   7 
S. Water Stat. N/A         1.39%   5 
S. Zoning N/A         2.50%   9 
Other S. C-L Public Trust, Unjust Enrichment, Property 
Damage, Indemnification 
        3.33% 12 
Other S. Non-Reg. S. Constitutional, S. RICO, Civil Conspir-
acy, Concert of Action 
        1.67%   6 
Other S. Reg. S. Air Quality, S. FOIA, S. ESA, S. 
Agency, Seismic Hazards Act 
 
       4.17% 15 
Note:  The middle column contains an exhaustive list of cause of action subcategories. Subcategories 
for “Other F. Reg.” and “Other S. Reg.” were summarized due to space constraints.  
 
 Figure 1 reports the relative percentage for each cause of action category 
(that is, out of 360 total causes of action) in the data. Clearly, regulatory caus-
es of action dominate. Specifically, federal regulatory causes of action amount 
                                                                                                                                  
  51. A detailed explanation of these 21 cause of action categories is provided in Appendix A.  
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to 63.6 percent of the combined observations, while state regulatory causes of 
action account for 26.67 percent. The remaining causes of action pleaded 
amount to approximately 10 percent of the data, with tort causes of action 
representing only a marginal 1.11 (federal) and 1.94 (state) percent. The pre-
dominance of regulatory causes of action and the dearth of tort claims provides 
the first empirical illustration of plaintiffs’ adjustment to the difficulties in-
volved in proving the latter. The diffuse nature of anthropogenic climate 
change sources and the widespread effects of climate change make it particu-
larly difficult for plaintiffs to establish that emissions from a specific GHG 
facility should be abated or that the operator of such facility be found liable for 
climate change-related harms. Conversely, prosecuting regulatory causes of 
action is generally simpler.  
 























Note: See Table 2 for further details on the coding of the causes of action. 
 
 Plaintiffs’ attorneys may also prefer pleading regulatory causes of action 
because of litigation costs, which tend to be lower than prosecuting tort claims, 
with costly depositions, discovery, and other expenses typically associated 
with civil litigation.52 Environmental advocacy groups or firms that specialize 
                                                                                                                                  
  52. We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer who asked us to make this point more force-
fully. Unfortunately, external constraints make it unfeasible for us, at this time and with current 
resources, to undertake further research on whom exactly are the lawyers bringing these cases (for 
example, environmental NGO lawyers, tort-bar-plaintiff firms, self-represented plaintiffs, and so 
Colares & Ristovski 
 
 
344 54 JURIMETRICS 
in representing them, not climate change victims, tend to be the more common 
plaintiffs. Furthermore, the NGO bar may be more inclined to bring regulatory 
claims not only because of their lower costs and “more manageable burdens of 
proof, but also because those are the kinds of claims [they] are accustomed to 
bringing.”53 Indeed, NGOs subsist primarily on donor funding, unlike plain-
tiff-side tort firms to whom the possibility of recovering substantial fees from 
prosecuting environmental tort claims only occasionally makes good business 
sense. In other words, the need to limit litigation costs accounts for the NGO 
bar’s accumulated expertise and, arguably, preference for pleading regulatory 
claims. Thus, the industrial organization of legal practice in this area helps 
explain the distribution of claims we have detected so far and may influence 
how causes of action in climate change-related complaints can be grouped or 
clustered together. The detection of patterns in cause of action groupings—
patterns that reflect the pleading constraints to which different climate change 
attorneys are subjected and the particular way in which their industry is orga-
nized—can help us identify trends that allow better predictions about the fu-
ture of this type of litigation and its implications.  
3. Methodology 
a. Use of Cluster Analysis in the Legal Field  
Usage of cluster analysis to distinguish among features and identify 
potentially meaningful groupings in a dataset is widespread in legal 
information systems.54 Cluster analysis is not a unified statistical technique but 
a collection of quantitative methods “that can be used to group (i.e., cluster) 
data meaningfully.”55 These methods seek to isolate homogenous groups 
among otherwise diverse observations, while ensuring that such groups are as 
distinct from each other as possible due to the presence or absence of certain 
attributes.56 In legal information systems, case text indexing followed by the 
identification of case groupings that share a common attribute through 
clustering techniques allows for the collection of closely related groups of 
                                                                                                                                  
forth) Despite not being able to report concrete figures, an eyeball review of the list of complaints 
and plaintiff names indicates that lawyers in the NGO bar brought the majority of these cases.  
  53. This astute observation came in the form of another suggestion by the same anonymous 
reviewer.  
  54. See Erich Schweighofer and Dieter Sheithauer, The Automatic Generation of Hypertext 
Links in Legal Documents, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATABASE AND EXPERT 
SYSTEMS APPLICATIONS (1996); Erich Schweighofer et al., Information Filtering: The Computa-
tion of Similarities in Large Corpora of Legal Texts, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 119 (1995); Howard Turtle, Text Retrieval in the Legal 
World, 3 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 5, 6 (1995).  
  55. See Jonathan A. Lesser & Emma Nicholson, Abandon All Hope? FERC’s Evolving 
Standards for Identifying Comparable Firms and Estimating the Rate of Return, 30 ENERGY L.J. 
105, 125 (2009) (citing G. David Garson, Cluster Analysis, http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/PA765. 
cluster.htm). Although the Garson web page cited by Lesser and Nicholson is no longer posted 
and not accessible via the Internet Archive index, the work has since been published. See G. 
DAVID CARSON, CLUSTER ANALYSIS 552 (2012).  
  56. Id.  
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cases, thus facilitating legal research. 57  “Headnotes” in Westlaw and 
“KeyCite” in Lexis result from a combination of text indexing algorithms and 
clustering methods that allow for the identification of numerous cases and 
statutes that cover a common legal doctrine or concept.  
In academic legal writing, researchers have applied clustering techniques 
to reveal grouping patterns in opinions from courts as distinct as 
supranational58 and national, subject-matter-based courts.59 Consultants and 
scholars have also used cluster analysis to identify and sort groups of actors 
that operate in widely different legal settings. Lesser and Nicholson examined 
data on regulated electric companies and natural gas pipelines that faced 
different rates of return and risk to identify proxy groups of financially 
comparable entities to optimize agency rate-setting criteria. 60  Cross and 
Lindquist developed a clustering method for identifying federal appellate 
judge groupings according to similarities (and dissimilarities) in decision 
making that allow policymakers and others to evaluate judges according to the 
characteristics that fit their own preferred judicial model.61 More recently, 
Boyd and her coauthors applied cluster analysis to a dataset containing a 
sample of civil complaints filed in federal court between 2000 and 2008 and 
identified eight major cause-of-action clusters.62 Because our study’s primary 
unit of analysis (that is, causes of action) and source of data (that is, filed civil 
complaints) closely mirror Boyd and her coauthor’s, our grouping technique 
(that is, spectral clustering) is inevitably similar. Occasional differences 
between Boyd and her coauthor’s and our methodological choices (for 
example, cluster algorithm properties and so forth) are attributable to inherent 
differences in our data (for example, different number of cause of action 
categories, nonredundant recording of causes of action appearing in different 
counts within the same complaint, smaller dataset, and so forth).63  
b. Clustering Complaints 
To classify and group the complaints in the data according to their 
similarities in causes of action, we used the Jaccard coefficient, which 
distributes observations into prespecified numbers of categories using a 
                                                                                                                                  
  57. See Dieter Merkl & Erich Schweighofer, En Route to Data Mining in Legal Text Corpo-
ra: Clustering, Neural Computation, and International Treaties, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON DATABASE AND EXPERT SYSTEM APPLICATIONS 465, 465–70 
(IEEE CS Press 1997), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.40. 
4183&rep=rep1&type=pdf.  
  58. See Yonatan Lupu & Erik Voeten, Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analy-
sis of Case Citations by the European Court of Human Rights, 42 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 413 (2012).  
  59. See Michael J. Bommarito II et al., An Empirical Survey of the Population of the U.S. 
Tax Court Written Decisions, 30 VA. TAX REV. 523 (2011). 
  60. See Lesser & Nicholson, supra note 55, at 125–28.  
  61. See Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, Judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1425–
26 (2009). 
  62. See Boyd et al., supra note 43, at 258.  
  63. See id. at 262–64.  
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method that takes into account similarities among pairs of complaints.64 We 
specified the number of k clusters based on our prior knowledge of this area of 
litigation and on inferences we derived from the data.65 For example, we 
expected (based on prior knowledge and from information in Table 2 and 
Figure 1) two large regulatory clusters (one state, one federal), a pair of mixed 
state-federal regulatory clusters, a couple of smaller mixed regulatory-
nonregulatory clusters and, possibly, a small state-federal tort cluster.  
To reduce subjectivity when deciding upon the optimum number of clus-
ters, we pursued a stability-based method of clustering by varying k (that is, 
the number of clusters) and comparing clustering outcomes from pairs of sub-
samples generated from the data.66 Specifically, we generated 100 such sample 
pairs for each arbitrary k and observed the similarity of the clustering results 
between pairs of subsamples. Our measure of similarity for a subsample pair 
from a given k ranged from 0 (no similarity) to 1 (perfect similarity). Having 
100 pairs, we generated similarity distributions for each k. When the sample 
distributions produced a significant drop-off away from 1, we knew we had 
split a real cluster, so we were ready to decide on a k. In our data, the largest 
drop-off in the distribution of similarities occurred when we increased k from 
six to seven. Accordingly, we determined the optimum number of clusters to 
be six.  
By way of illustration, Figure 2 shows a plot of the similarity matrices of 
complaints obtained before and after clustering, with brighter pixels illus-
trating higher similarities. Looking at Figure 2(a), the patched, though random, 
spread of complaints displayed before clustering illustrates the dichotomous 
nature of our data (that is, federal and state complaints).67 Despite Fig-
ure 2(a)’s interesting pattern, Figure 2(b) is much more revealing, with its 
display of six square blocks along a main diagonal that indicates a high simi-
                                                                                                                                  
  64. This partition clustering method has been intuitively described as “an analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) exercise[d] backwards” that partitions data into “groups that minimize ‘within-
group’ variation while maximizing ‘between-group’ variation.” See Lesser & Nicholson, supra 
note 55, at 126 n.125 (citation omitted).  
  65. For a more detailed description of the k-means clustering method, see ROBERT B. BURNS 
& RICHARD A. BURNS, BUSINESS RESEARCH METHODS AND STATISTICS USING SPSS 557–58 
(2009) (e-version with extra chapters), available at http://www.uk.sagepub.com/burns/website% 
20material/Chapter%2023%20-%20Cluster%20Analysis.pdf. Empirical scholars have used other 
methods to determine cluster membership, arguably due to theoretical reasons or to address the 
particular characteristics and size of their datasets. See, e.g., Cross & Lindquist, supra note 61, at 
1383 (Ward’s Method); Lesser & Nicholson, supra note 55, at 125–26 (Squared Euclidean Dis-
tance).  
  66. See Asa Ben-Hur et al., A Stability Based Method for Discovering Structure in Clustered 
Data, 17 PAC. SYMP. ON BIOCOMPUTING 6 (2002).  
  67. No potentially risk-increasing complaints in our dataset were removed from state to 
federal court. Some complaints originally filed in federal court may eventually be refiled in state 
court, due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Kivalina, for example, the federal district judge 
dismissed plaintiffs’ state nuisance claims without prejudice (probably under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(c)(3)), a ruling that the Ninth Circuit upheld. See Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 882–83 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849, 866 (9th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013) (No. 12-1072). These plaintiffs have yet to file their 
state law-based claims in state court.  
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larity among cases in the six identified clusters. Notably, the sizes of the 
square-clusters differ according to the number of complaints in each cluster. 
As expected, two big clusters dominate and four smaller clusters of varying 
sizes capture the remaining groupings.  
 
Figure 2. Similarity Matrices among Complaints  
Prior to and Following Spectral Clustering 
 











Note: Brighter pixels on gray scale images represent higher similarity while dark ones indi-
cate low similarity. Figure 2(a) is made with a random arrangement of the cases in the 
dataset while data points in Figure 2(b) are arranged in cluster order, with the six light 
boxes on the diagonal indicating the clusters. 
D. Results 
1. Cluster Analysis 
 Although the generally liberal nature of pleading in the United States 
makes a large number of complaint clusters a theoretical possibility, pressures 
ranging from the specialized nature of climate change-related litigation to the 
industrial organization of legal practice (for example, greater representation of 
NGO plaintiff-attorneys, who may be more comfortable bringing fewer, low-
er-cost, administrative claims than expensive-to-litigate tort claims; law firm 
practice that follows a business-driven approach to litigation cost; and likeli-
hood of recovery) combine to constrain plaintiffs’ pleading strategies. Fur-
thermore, the concern with loss of reputation and the possibility of monetary 
penalties for frivolous claims do seem to influence attorneys’ pleading strate-
gies.68 The result, as Table 3 illustrates, is a small number of co-occurring 
                                                                                                                                  
  68. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An 
Empirical Study, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 577, 592 & 595–96 (2010) (positing that the desire to 
appear credible to judges restrains plaintiffs’ counsel from pursuing punitive damages in states 
where punitive damages are permitted and demonstrating that “state rules restricting punitive 
damages are significantly associated with the rate at which punitive damages are sought.”). For an 
illustration of how counsel for defendants also make far fewer motions to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) than one would expect of unrestrained advocates see generally 
JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 
AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 10 
(2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Publications/motion 
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complaint groupings. As explained, each cluster contains the most frequently 
occurring causes of action in related complaints. Table 3 columns show the 
raw frequencies and relative percentages for each of the six clusters detected. 
Statistics regarding the distribution of the 21 causes of action across different 
complaint clusters are displayed in rows.  
 
Table 3. Distribution of 21 Cause of Action Categories  
Among Six Complaint Clusters 
Clusters 
Cause of Action #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 Total 
 






















































































































































































































































                                                                                                                                  
iqbal.pdf (showing extremely low estimates of the likelihood that a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 
will be filed within the first 90 days); JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON 
RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(b)(6) MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND: REPORT TO THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 4 (2011), available at http://www. 
fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal2.pdf/$file/motioniqbal2.pdf (confirming results from ear-
lier report).  
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About four-fifths of our complaints fell into Cluster 2 (57.78 percent) and 
Cluster 3 (24.17 percent), each dominated by federal and state regulatory 
claims, respectively. Remarkably, nine of the twelve federal regulatory causes 
of action (for example, F. Ag. Reg., F. APA, F. CWA, F. ESA, F. FLPMA, F. 
NEPA, F. NHPA, F. NFMA and Other F. Reg.) appearing in Cluster 2 had 
very high frequencies of occurrence in that cluster (that is, ranging from 80 to 
100 percent). Most of the remaining causes of action in Cluster 2 were also 
federal regulatory claims, which shows this is an essentially federal regulatory 
cluster. That this cluster alone contains nearly three-fifths of all causes of 
action pled in climate change-related complaints demonstrates the dominance 
of federal regulatory law in this field. Curiously, the dominance of federal 
regulatory law notwithstanding, the second largest cluster, Cluster 3, is just as 
homogenous. State causes of action are predominant (93.10 percent), with 
state regulatory claims dominating the cluster, which contains all state zoning 
claims, nearly all state NEPA claims (95.08 percent),69 60 percent of state-
based water claims and over half of Other S. Reg. claims (53.33 percent).  
Despite the high concentration of complaints within two clusters, the 
remaining four smaller clusters provide an enriched perspective on plaintiffs’ 
pleading strategies in climate change-related litigation. Lower-incidence 
clusters indicate that plaintiffs are less keen to plead (or actually avoid 
pleading) certain cause of action groupings, perhaps due to the greater 
difficulty and cost of litigating them or because of a perceived lower success 
rate in adjudicating them. For instance, proving causation in tort claims is 
generally more complex than proving noncompliance with a given regulatory 
requirement. The multiple anthropogenic sources of GHG emissions, their 
fungibility and resulting difficulty in connecting specific harms to specific 
sources create the greatest obstacle to “proving that a particular source of 
GHG emissions should be held legally responsible for contributing to climate 
                                                                                                                                  
  69. Although we recognize the incongruence of referring to state NEPA claims (NEPA after 
all designates a national (that is, federal) statute), we use S. NEPA to identify state statutes that 
are the counterparts to the nearly eponymous federal statute.  
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change.”70 These legal difficulties along with factors associated with the in-
dustrial organization of environmental law practice, as discussed in Part I.C.2, 
explain why plaintiffs rarely plead tort causes of action (see Table 3). We 
detected this grouping of rare claims in Cluster 4. All F. Tort claims and over 
four-fifths (85.70 percent) of S. Tort claims appear in this cluster. Other 
significant pairings in the remaining smaller clusters are as follows: four-fifths 
of F. CAA claims and half of S. Adm. Proc. claims appear in Cluster 1; four-
fifths of F. FOIA claims and 13.33 percent of Other S. Reg. claims, a category 
that includes the state FOIA claims, appear in Cluster 5; and over four-fifths of 
Other S. C-L claims (83.33 percent) and one-fifth of S. Water Stat. claims (20 
percent, which is the second highest percentage of all claims in this grouping) 
appear in Cluster 6.  
Although describing differences in relative cluster sizes and compositions 
can be enlightening, visualizing cluster compositions allows for easier 
detection of pleading patterns in climate change-related complaints. As Figure 
3 illustrates, Clusters 1, 3, 5 and 6 are each dominated by a single cause of action 
 
Figure 3. Causes of Action in Each Cluster 
 
Note: Causes of action composing two percent or less of a cluster are excluded for 
readability purposes. 
 
(F. CAA, S. NEPA, F. FOIA & Other S. C-L, respectively) whose frequency 
far exceeds that of other causes of action in the cluster, while Clusters 2 and 4 
                                                                                                                                  
  70. Kirsten H. Engel, Harmonizing Regulatory and Litigation Approaches to Climate 
Change Mitigation: Incorporating Tradable Emissions Offsets into Common Law Remedies, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 1563, 1585 (2006). See also David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical 
Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 23 (2003) (noting that, 
“generally speaking, courts have not considered statistical associations like those produced by 
epidemiological studies to be adequate proof of specific causation . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 293, 297 (2005) (indicating that 
“defendants will argue that they are responsible for a small portion of the world’s greenhouse gas 
emissions, so small that it cannot fairly be said that they are ‘the cause’ of global climate 
change.”). 
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are more balanced around two or three causes of action, despite having a 
clearly dominant cause of action. Spectral analysis reveals the presence of 
regulatory claims in every cluster, with regulatory groupings largely 
segregated according to subject matter and sovereign source. However, the 
much less frequent tort claims appear mostly together in a single cluster 
(Cluster 4), regardless of whether they arise under state or federal law.  
Closer examination of the composition of each cluster reveals the 
following trends in pleading. 
Cluster 1:  This is a diverse regulatory cluster that contains a large 
percentage of federal Clean Air Act claims (nearly 60 percent of 
causes of action) and a scattering of federal and state regulatory 
claims. 
Cluster 2:  This cluster is exclusively composed of federal regulatory claims 
and contains nine causes of action, the greatest number of causes 
of action groupings in a single cluster. It is the most homogenous 
and biggest cluster (see Table 3), with plaintiffs favoring F. 
NEPA, F. APA, F. ESA over all other claims.  
Cluster 3: This cluster is dominated by state regulatory claims. It is the 
second biggest (see Table 3) and second most disproportionate 
cluster. S. NEPA makes up approximately 67 percent of the 
cluster, while each of the remaining causes of action amount to at 
most 10% of the cluster.  
Cluster 4:  Although this is the most diverse cluster, it is dominated by tort 
claims, which make up nearly 50 percent of its causes of action. 
Nearly all tort claims appear here, along with state and federal 
regulatory claims and one state common law claim (see Table 3).  
Cluster 5:  Although diverse, nearly 90 percent of this cluster is made up of 
federal and state regulatory claims, with claims arising under F. 
FOIA dominating the cluster (44 percent). Containing only nine 
causes of action, one of which is a state tort, it is also the smallest 
cluster (see Table 3).  
Cluster 6:  This cluster is exclusively composed of state regulatory and a 
large number of Other S. C-L (that is, nontort) claims. These 
common-law claims represent nearly 80 percent of the cluster, 
with each of the remaining causes of action amounting to at most 
eight percent. This ten-fold difference in frequency makes this 
the most disproportionate cluster. 
In sum, two complaint clusters perfectly segregate federal causes of action 
(Cluster 2) from state causes of action (Cluster 6), two other clusters are quite 
mixed (Clusters 4 and 5) and the remaining ones (Clusters 1 and 3) are lop-
sided, with federal or state regulatory claims dominating in each. Most telling, 
perhaps, is the general low frequency of state and federal tort causes of action 
in a sea of federal and state regulatory claims. Even Cluster 4, the “torts clus-
Colares & Ristovski 
 
 
352 54 JURIMETRICS 
ter,” contains state and federal regulatory causes of action, a further illustration 
of plaintiffs’ tendency to plead regulatory claims in this area of litigation.71  
2. Beyond Clusters: Visualizing Relationships among Causes of Action 
 Although clustering allows sorting out complaints into different groups 
according to certain shared attributes (for example, state vs. federal, mixed, 
regulatory vs. nonregulatory, and so forth), thus permitting the detection of 
clear-cut pleading patterns in the data, clustering does not reveal much about 
the interactions among causes of action within complaints. Because causes of 
action raised in the same complaint are necessarily grounded on a common set 
of facts that must plausibly establish an entitlement to relief, one intuitively 
expects the data to also contain some patterns in the joinder of causes of action 
within complaints. In Figure 4, we depict such interactions spatially by means 
of a Fruchterman-Reingold force-directed graph that enables straightforward 
visualization and allows some interesting conclusions.72  
Figure 4. Fruchterman-Reingold Force  




















Note: The figure results from a Fruchterman-Reingold force directed graph  
          layout for weighted graphs.  
                                                                                                                                  
  71. As explained above, whether plaintiffs succeed by joining these additional nontort claims 
and, more generally, what are the outcomes of climate change litigation will be the topic of a 
future study.  
  72. This graph layout, created in R, arranges spatial representations of causes of actions in 
the data according to their co-occurrence and similarity. To calculate the similarity among causes 
of action, we used the Jaccard coefficient, which we calculated by representing each 
cause_of_actioni (i = 1, . . ., 21), as a binary vector, with value 1 at position j, denoting the appear-
ance of cause of action “i” in complaint “j” (j = 1, . . ., 178).  
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 To understand the graph in Figure 4, bear in mind that the nodes (that is, 
black dots) illustrate the relative location of each cause of action (see Table 2) 
raised in the coded complaints. The size of each node reflects the raw fre-
quency of each cause of action in the data. The thickness of the line connecting 
two nodes represents how likely they are to appear together in the same com-
plaint. For example, the line connecting F. Tort and S. Tort is thick because 
these causes of action are pled almost invariably together, yet the size of their 
respective nodes is small, reflecting their low individual frequencies in the 
data. Finally, the distance between any two nodes is directly proportional to 
how similar they are in terms of their connections. Thus, the thickness of con-
necting lines and proximity of the causes of action arising under the federal 
APA, NEPA and ESA statutes reflect their high co-occurrence within com-
plaints and connection similarity. Their large node sizes denote their high 
individual frequency of pleading. 
Figure 4 also illustrates the extent to which some causes of action are 
isolated from others. For example, S. Zoning appears at the top, isolated and 
with few outward relationships, the strongest of which being with S. NEPA. 
Indeed, this spatial representation illustrates in a different way what we 
witnessed before: the presence of all S. Zoning causes of action in a single 
cluster (Cluster 3)73 along with nearly all S. NEPA causes of action (95 
percent) in that cluster. Although appearing in the same cluster, the connecting 
line between these two is not as thick as that between F. Tort and S. Tort 
because they did not appear as frequently in the same complaint. In contrast, 
other centrally located, more frequent causes of action, such as S. NEPA, CAA 
and O.S. Obs. have weak relationships, demonstrated by their comparatively 
large number of thin, outward connections. These numerous thin connections 
show that the latter causes of action have no discernable patterns of 
interaction, in sharp distinction to the also centrally located APA, NEPA, ESA 
triad, discussed above.  
3. Beyond Clusters: Detecting Co-Occurrence of Causes of Action 
We now examine the co-occurrence of causes of action to determine 
which pairs are most (and least) likely to appear in the same complaint. First, 
we display such pairings without regard to the relative incidence of a particular 
cause of action in the data. Figure 5(a) displays the top ten most frequently 
paired causes of action, and Figure 5(b) displays the top ten least frequently 
paired ones.74 One should approach Figure 5 results with caution. For instance, 
despite infrequent pleading of F. Tort and S. Tort causes of action in the data, 
the F. Tort-S. Tort pairing ranks as the top cause-of-action pair, with a near 60 
                                                                                                                                  
  73. See supra Table 3 and Figure 3. 
  74. To calculate the likelihood of co-occurrence of these causes of action (without consid-
ering their overall frequency in the data), we used the formula: |a∩b| / |aUb|, where “a” and “b” 
denote different causes of action. This formula gives the ratio of the number of complaints in 
which two causes of action appear together over the number of complaints in which they appear.  
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percent co-occurrence rate.75 While indicating that when plaintiffs plead tort 
claims, they are more likely to plead F. Tort and S. Tort claims together than 
otherwise, this result obviously does not take into account how infrequently 
the two causes of action appear in the data, and thus can be misleading.  
To perform a more robust co-occurrence analysis, we developed a t-
distributed statistic that tests the statistical significance of cause-of-action 
pairs, while accounting for the frequency of individual causes of action in the 
data. Through a Bernoulli trial, we randomly generated pairs of causes of 
action and then compared these random estimates with the actual pairs we 
observed in the 178 complaints in the data (see Appendix B for a detailed 
explanation). Table 4 reports the ten most and least significant co-occurrences 
according to observed t (one tailed) and p values. Remarkably, Table 4 shows 
the F. Tort-S. Tort pair is the last statistically significant pair in the data (t 
=1.94; p < .05), an illustration of how our test discounts the lower individual 
occurrence of these causes of action and still captures strong absolute co-
occurrences. It is also noteworthy that, other than the F. Tort-S. Tort pair, no 
federal-state pair is statistically significant. Indeed, nine out of the ten most 
statistically significant pairs—some of which were not significant at the .05 
level—are federal claims paired with other federal claims and a single set of 
paired state claims. Again, this reflects the tendency toward homogeneity we 
detected in spectral clustering: complaints do not frequently contain both fed-
eral and state causes of action. The lower half of Table 4 shows that seven of 
the ten bottom co-occurrences are federal-state claim pairings, which further 
demonstrates plaintiffs’ general lack of interest in filing mixed complaints.  
 
                                                                                                                                  
  75. Of the seven separate complaints that alleged tort causes of action, five combined federal 
and state tort claims. See Complaint for Damages Demand for Jury Trial, Native Village of Ki-
valina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2390 (2013) 
(No. 12-1072); Complaint, AEP v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (No. 104CV05669); SF 
Chapter of A. Phillip Randolph Institute v. EPA, No. C-07-4936-CRB, 2008 WL 859985 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 28, 2008); Second Amended Complaint for Damages and Declaratory Judgment, People 
of State of California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *16 (N.D. 
Cal. Sep. 17, 2007) (No. C06-05755 EMC); Korsinsky v. EPA, No. 05 Civ. 859 (NRB), 2005 WL 
2414744, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 29, 2005). The remaining two complaints alleged only state tort 
causes of action. See Class Action Complaint, Comer v. Murphy Oil, 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. 
Miss. 2012) (No. 11CV00220); First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
Complaint, Musicraft, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, No. 09-945 CZ (Washtenaw Co. Cir. Ct. Aug. 
11, 2009). 
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Figure 5. Co-Occurrence of Cause of Action Pairs 
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II. MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR PLEADINGS 
A. Tort vs. Regulatory Pleading 
One of the most striking results from the above empirical analysis is the 
low frequency of tort claim pleading in climate change suits. Evidence of the 
rarity of tort pleading appeared in both complaint clustering and within 
complaint co-occurrence analyses. Closer examination of the data (see Table 
3) reveals that from a universe of 360 causes of action (culled from 178 
complaints), tort claims (seven state, four federal) amounted to 3.06 percent of 
all claims, which appeared in only seven complaints or 3.93 percent of all 
complaints. Similarly, plaintiffs pled a low volume of nontort common law 
claims. Specifically, they failed to plead a single nontort federal common law 
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claim and only pled 12 such state-based claims (3.33 percent) in 12 complaints 
or 6.74 percent of all complaints. On the other hand, plaintiffs’ tendency to 
plead regulatory claims stands in sharp contrast, as demonstrated by greater 
the pleading rates for federal (63.61 percent) and state (26.67 percent) 
regulatory causes of action and frequencies of such causes of action in 
complaints (58.99 percent and 40.45 percent). Overall, plaintiffs pled 
regulatory claims 92.7 percent of the time.76  
 Arguably, the observed high frequency of pleading regulatory causes of 
action relative to torts can be attributed to plaintiffs’ recognition of the diffi-
culty in proving causation in the latter. It may also be the result of wider, un-
derlying forces currently constraining potential plaintiffs’ choices regarding 
whether to file such causes of action. Current doctrines on standing, particu-
larly the traceability-causation requirement, and federal common law displace-
ment have likely had a claim-suppressing effect. Indeed, having to 
demonstrate that one’s injury is “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action 
of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some 
third party not before the court,” is especially difficult when the diffuse nature 
of anthropogenic climate change sources and the widespread effects of climate 
change are considered.77 On the preemption side, the presence in the CAA of a 
variety of regulatory enforcement mechanisms, through states,78 EPA79 and 
even private citizen suits,80 has been construed to displace federal common 
law nuisance abatement (that is, injunctive) claims.81 More recently, the Ninth 
Circuit adopted an expanded conceptualization of displacement by holding 
that AEP had interpreted congressional action in passing the CAA as extin-
guishing plaintiffs’ federal common law public nuisance damage claims (that 
is, for harms caused by past emissions), “along with federal common law 
public nuisance abatement actions.”82 Under this interpretation and in light of 
the absence of a specific federal damages action under the CAA, plaintiffs are 
left with state nuisance law as the sole “available option [and] only to the 
                                                                                                                                  
  76. We determined the actual percentage of federal and state regulatory causes of action in 
all complaints by performing the following calculation: |aUb| – |a∩b| / n, where a and b are the 
raw	  frequencies of each type of cause of action and n is the total number of complaints.  
  77. See Pritikin v. Dep’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 797 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). 
  78. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (2012) (allowing states and private parties to petition EPA to set 
an emission standard if EPA has not done so); accord  
  79. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2012) (providing the definition of “air pollutant”). See also 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (holding that GHG emissions from new motor 
vehicles qualify as air pollutants and that, as such, EPA has the statutory authority to regulate 
them).  
  80. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2012) (allowing “any person” to enforce emission standards in 
federal court). 
  81. See Am. Elec. Power, Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011). It might be 
useful to remind the reader that in AEP, a number of states, a city and three private land trusts 
sought to enjoin the five GHG-emitter defendants by requesting judicial imposition of emissions 
caps. Id. at 2534.  
  82. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 847 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(Pro, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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extent it is not preempted by federal law.”83 Although one can certainly sur-
mise that federal standing and displacement-preemption doctrines have sup-
pressed tort claims, it is difficult to quantify the magnitude of the suppression 
because information regarding the nonfiling of complaints and causes of action 
is nearly impossible to obtain.84 Regardless, common sense and a basic under-
standing of how legal institutions and stare decisis operate compel one to con-
clude that trends in doctrine and litigation outcomes influence potential 
plaintiff’s incentives and decisions on whether to sue and what to plead.85  
One may be tempted to hypothesize that such a screening effect also ex-
plains why plaintiffs pleading federal or state common law tort claims tend to 
include regulatory causes of action in their pleadings (see Figure 4 and Table 
3). Surely, the liberal pleading philosophy behind the Federal Rules—espe-
cially R. 8(d)(2)–(3), allowing parties to plead claims in the alternative and 
“regardless of consistency”—and the transactional approach to claim preclu-
sion of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 (1982)—requiring 
plainttifs to plead all transactionally related claims in one action—provide 
plaintiffs with strong incentives to join all claims and forms of relief available 
in their initial complaints.86 Yet, pleading regulatory causes of action with tort 
claims does not free plaintiffs from the difficulty of overcoming defensive 
challenges based on displacement of federal common law-based claims, pre-
emption of state law-based claims, and standing. As the scope and pace of 
EPA’s GHG emission regulations increase, nuisance claims for emission 
abatement are more likely to be perceived as arguments for emission standards 
different from those mandated by EPA, just as claims for economic damages 
                                                                                                                                  
  83. Id. at 866 (Pro, P., concurring). Note, however, that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Kivalina 
that displacement of federal common law claims for injunctive relief necessarily means displace-
ment of federal common law claims for damages has no bearing on the question of state common 
law preemption. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 511 (1992) (holding that 
while state law claims for injunctive relief (that is, requiring tobacco companies to provide addi-
tional warnings and labeling) were preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act, state com-
mon law claims for damages from smoke-related injuries were not preempted).  
  84. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in 
Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 755 (1992) (indicating the difficulty of obtaining 
documentation regarding disputes terminated at the prefiling stages of litigation); Eisenberg & 
Farber, supra note 27, at S92, S93–97 (proposing a “theoretical framework for understanding the 
operation of th[e] suit-selection process and its relationship to the underlying distribution of 
potential claims and claimants.”).  
  85. For a specific empirical illustration of how different states’ rules regarding punitive 
damages affect attorneys’ pleading habits and influence them to restrain themselves see Eisenberg 
et al., supra note 68, at 611–15.  
  86. That liberal pleading under the Federal Rules and the broad approach to claim preclusion 
of Section 24 would give tort claimants’ incentives to also plead regulatory claims appears plau-
sible in this context. Of the seven complaints that included state tort causes of action six were filed 
in federal court. See cases cited supra note 75. Even if state court complaints alleging state tort 
claims were numerous, this reasoning would mostly apply because the Federal Rules and their 
pleading philosophy have influenced the procedural law of most states. See FIELD ET AL., supra 
note 33, at 34–35 n.b (indicating also that “some populous states [though not the majority] remain 
importantly distinctive.”) (citations omitted). The same can be said regarding the “considerable 
and increasing case support” for the broad transactional approach to claim preclusion of Section 
24. Id. at 706.  
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associated with the widespread harms of climate change might be viewed as 
threatening the overall purpose of the federal regulatory scheme. Construed 
broadly, these different types of relief would directly clash with the CAA’s 
current enforcement mechanisms.87 Thus, adding regulatory claims to federal 
common law nuisance claims does not help plaintiffs address common law 
displacement challenges nor does it obviate the need to satisfy the traceability 
prong of standing. In sum, rather than a strategy to improve plaintiffs’ chances 
of overcoming expected preemption and standing challenges, the joinder of 
regulatory claims with tort claims only helps avoid claim preclusion. The same 
applies to plaintiffs joining regulatory claims with state common law claims: 
they may avoid defenses grounded on preclusion—and displacement would 
obviously not apply—but they still must overcome likely standing and pre-
emption-based challenges.  
B. Federal vs. State Claim Pleading 
The other major trend detected in the clustering and co-occurrence 
analyses is the extent to which plaintiffs’ risk-increasing, climate change-
related causes of action are either federal-law based or state-law based, instead 
of mixed. This is also illustrated by Table 5, which provides the breakdown of 
initial filings according to court type and filing content. The fact that over a 
quarter (27.53 percent) of plaintiffs’ original judicial filings are appellate 
briefs partly explains this phenomenon. The result of prior litigation at the 
agency level, appellate briefs are likely to only include claims arising under 
the laws and regulations invoked before the challenged state or federal 
agencies, hence the infrequency of hybrid claims at the appellate level. The 
existence of parallel tracks of administrative adjudication before state and 
federal agencies explains this phenomenon. In regard to actual complaints 
(72.47 percent of all initial judicial filings), the parallel existence of diversity 
jurisdiction and general jurisdiction in federal and state courts, respectively, 
attenuates the tendency that disputes arising under the law of one class of 
sovereign be necessarily decided by courts of that sovereign. In other words, 
because plaintiffs face less subject-matter-based restrictions when filing 
complaints versus when filing appellate briefs, they are more likely to file 
mixed-content complaints. This is illustrated by the higher percentage of 
federal (and total) mixed filings. That said, plaintiffs still file mixed 
complaints in only a minority of the cases. As Table 5 demonstrates, plaintiffs 
only filed eight mixed complaints in federal court (4.49 percent) and only a 
single mixed complaint in state court (0.56 percent). Thus, the overall 
regulatory nature of climate change-related litigation (recall that plaintiffs 
plead regulatory claims 92.7 percent of the time) and the two-tiered structure 
of government exert a powerful channelling effect, influencing plaintiffs to file 
their grievances under either federal or state law.  
                                                                                                                                  
  87. See discussion supra Part II.A and accompanying notes 78–80.  
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Table 5. Initial Filings and Federal-State Diversity 
 
Initial Filing Type 
 
 
No. of Filings  
(% of total) 
 
No. of Mixed Filings 
(% of total) 
 
Actual Complaints 




99  (55.62) 
 
 
8  (4.49) 
          Filed in State Court 30  (16.85) 1  (0.56) 
          Total            129  (72.47) 9  (5.06) 
   
Appellate Briefs   
          Filed in Federal 
Court 
          Filed in State Court 
            10    (5.62) 
            39  (21.91) 
0  (0.00) 
3  (1.69) 
          Total 
 
            49  (27.53) 3  (1.69) 
 
III. HYPOTHESIS TESTING 
 The discussion above shows that legal doctrines applicable to general 
litigation and the federal structure of government in the United States seem to 
influence plaintiffs’ pleading strategies in climate change-related litigation. 
We also wanted to investigate the extent to which U.S. Supreme Court rulings 
in the climate change area have affected plaintiffs’ selection of causes of ac-
tion for litigation in the risk-increasing cases that are the focus of this study. A 
prior study empirically assessed the effect of at least one of the two most rele-
vant cases in this area: Massachusetts v. EPA.88 While concluding that, in post-
Massachusetts litigation, courts have not shown a preference for pro- or anti-
regulation “positions,” this result is likely plagued by selection bias due to its 
focus on win-rate data generated from judicial opinions. For instance, it is 
possible that, following Massachusetts, plaintiffs’ counsel adjusted their plead-
ings by filing more complaints or including more regulatory claims than they 
would have before, thus filing “weaker” complaints. Defense counsel, adept at 
recognizing weaker complaints, could easily react to this trend by settling less 
and pursuing full victory at trial.89 Together, these factors may explain why 
one would find courts favoring more “anti-regulation” positions. In other 
words, studying post-Massachusetts win rates will not fully capture how that 
                                                                                                                                  
  88. See Markell & Ruhl, supra note 45, at 21–22. The other most significant decision in this 
area is AEP v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011), which we discuss supra Part I.A and 
infra Part III.C.  
  89. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Reveal Any-
thing about the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 
(1997) (“the settlement process . . . produces a residue of litigated cases for which the win rate 
might indicate nothing more than the percentage of successful plaintiffs in this peculiar and non-
random sample of cases.”). 
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decision affected subsequent court decisions, much less account for the con-
tent of complaints that are filed and prosecuted in federal and state courts.  
 This is not to say that trends in litigation outcomes do not influence plain-
tiffs’ pleading strategies or whether they file at all.90 All we are saying is that a 
less selected or biased data can give a more accurate picture of the reality of 
litigation in this area. One way to reduce selection bias is to collect data from 
earlier, less filtered stages of litigation and then conduct tests on such data. 
Thus, coding complaints according to causes of action allows us not only to 
conduct spectral clustering but determine whether plaintiffs adjust the content 
of their pleadings to relevant decisions regarding climate change.  
A. Massachusetts and Federal Plaintiffs’ Pleading Strategy 
 Aware of the Massachusetts ruling, plaintiffs’ attorneys may react by 
pleading more regulatory causes of action arising under the CAA and other 
federal environmental statutes. They would do so in the hope that Massachu-
setts might influence the lower courts to uphold agencies’ authority to address 
the effects of GHG emissions across broader regulatory areas. Thus, causes of 
action arising under other sources of law, such as the United States Constitu-
tion, other federal statutes or common law, and state law might seem relatively 
less appealing. On balance, assuming ceteris paribus conditions, one would 
expect an increase in pleading CAA and other federal regulatory causes of 
action following Massachusetts. Hypothesis 1 describes this conjecture:  
H1: Supreme Court recognition of EPA’s statutory authority to regulate GHG 
emissions under the CAA has led plaintiffs to plead more federal regulatory 
causes of action. 
 Although binding on state courts, Massachusetts’ influence on pleading is 
far more relevant to litigants in federal courts, where nearly all federal regula-
tory causes of action (98.25 percent) are filed.91 Thus, to determine whether 
Massachusetts has impacted plaintiffs’ selection of federal regulatory causes 
of action, we considered exclusively federal court filings. These filings (109) 
are not distributed evenly: 28 complaints (25.69 percent) were filed before 
Massachusetts, while 81 complaints (74.31 percent) were filed after. Despite 
this unevenness, we are confident that there are enough earlier complaints (and 
causes of action) to provide a good before-and-after comparison.  
To test this hypothesis, we plot the kernel density of the number of federal 
regulatory causes of action filed per complaint before and after Massachusetts. 
                                                                                                                                  
  90. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 49, at 138 (explaining that litigants operate “in 
light of their knowledge of the applicable law,” which obviously includes knowledge of what 
judge-made law is in a given area).  
  91. Only four of 229 federal regulatory causes of action coded appeared in complaints filed 
in state court. See San Diego Navy Broadway Complex v. City of San Diego, 185 Cal. App. 4th 
924 (2010); Longleaf Energy Associates, Inc. v. Friends of the Chattahoochee, Inc., 298 Ga. App. 
753 (2009); Complaint, Musicraft, Inc. v. City of Ann Arbor, No. 09-945 CZ (Washtenaw Co. Cir. 
Ct. Aug. 11, 2009); Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 148 P.3d 960 (2006). 
These filings were not included due to our focus on the potential effect of Massachusetts on 
federal plaintiffs’ pleading strategy. 	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Figure 6 shows that the pre-Massachusetts distribution of the number of 
causes of action is concentrated between one and four per complaint. In 
contrast, complaints filed after Massachusetts have a wider distribution that 
spans from one to five causes of action per complaint. The probability density 
associated with the post-Massachusetts complaints also tails off more 
gradually as the number of causes of action increases. Although this graph 
appears to indicate a post-Massachusetts increase in the number of regulatory 
causes of action pled, pre- and post-Massachusetts complaints have the same 
median number of causes of action (two). Because this data is not normally 
distributed, we ran a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = -1.29; p = 0.10) and 
conclude that these distributions are not statistically different from each other. 
Worse, the negative value for the calculated test statistic—although not 
statistically significant—suggests that any Massachusetts “effect” might be 
correlated with a decrease in the number of regulatory causes of action pled, 
the opposite of what we theorized. In sum, post-Massachusetts plaintiffs have 
simply not plead more regulatory causes of action than before. Why did we not 
detect a Massachusetts effect? 
 
Figure 6. Kernel Density Plot of the Number of Regulatory Causes  
of Action per Complaint Following Massachusetts 
 
 
B. Did Twombly Subdue the Potential Impact of Massachusetts? 
Only a few weeks after deciding Massachusetts (April 2, 2007), the Court 
announced Twombly (May 21, 2007), which, as discussed in Part I.B, replaced 
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pleading enough facts to put defendants on notice92 with pleading “enough 
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” as the pleading 
standard under Rule 8(a)(2).93 Since then, to survive this heightened inquiry, 
claimants must ensure the factual strength of their pleadings “nudge[s] their 
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”94 Because Twombly 
applies to all federal civil litigation, disfavoring broad, multiclaim allegations 
that lack the requisite factual strength, one can surmise that potential federal 
plaintiffs took note of this greater stringency. Likewise, counsel involved in 
drafting climate change-related complaints presumably responded by selecting 
causes of action that can be supported with detailed facts, while pleading few-
er causes of action that are supported by scarce information at that early stage 
of litigation.  
As discussed in Part I.B, Boyd and her coauthors, who also coded causes 
of action from complaints filed in federal courts, found preliminary support for 
this hypothesis in all civil litigation.95 If plaintiffs have reduced the number of 
causes of action pled in civil complaints generally, it is possible that the an-
nouncement of Twombly so soon after Massachusetts may have nullified or 
suppressed the latter ruling’s expected claim-increasing impact on climate 
change-related pleading. Because pre- and post-Massachusetts complaint data 
almost perfectly overlap with pre- and post-Twombly complaint data—only 
three relevant complaints were filed in the interim96—it is perhaps impossible 
to untangle their presumably opposite effects. With the passage of time, more 
filings and a growing database of causes of action, further testing of this kind 
(for example, kernel density plots, rank-sum tests) and the addition of re-
gression analyses may clarify present uncertainties regarding climate change-
related pleading.  
Figure 7 provides the yearly average of causes of action in federally filed, 
climate change-related complaints in the period of study. Because no such 
complaints were filed between 1990 and 1992, or between 1994 and 2001, we 




                                                                                                                                  
  92. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 
U.S. 506, 514–15 (2002).  
  93. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (emphasis added).  
  94. See id.  
  95. See Boyd et al., supra note 43, at 258, 273–74.  
  96. See Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(identifying the causes of action petitioners filed on their original April 13, 2007 petition); Com-
plaint for Injunctive Relief Under the Freedom of Information Act at 2, California v. EPA, No. C 
07-2055 JSW (JL),	  2008 WL 5384623, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2008) (identifying the sole cause 
of action the state of California filed in its April 11, 2007 complaint); Petition for Writ of Man-
date, People v. County of San Bernardino, No. CIV.SS700329 (San Bernardino Super. Ct. Apr. 
13, 2007), available at http://ag.ca.gov/globalwarming/pdf/SanBernardino_complaint.pdf (identi-
fying the sole cause of action the state of California filed in its April 13, 2007 complaint). 
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Figure 7. Average Number of Causes  
of Action per Complaint in Federal Courts 
 
 
Notes: Yearly data reflects the average frequency of causes of action per complaint. 
The shaded areas indicate the U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Twombly (2007) 
and Iqbal (2009).  
 
 Although Figure 7 should be interpreted with caution, taking note of fluc-
tuations in the calculated yearly means, there is a slight overall declining trend 
in the average number of federal causes of action filed per complaint since 
2007. In particular, the 2007–2008 decline in yearly means mirrors the 2007–
2008 general decline in the number of all federally pled causes of action per 
complaint detected in Boyd and her coauthor’s 2013 study. While this simulta-
neous decline might be mere coincidence, the final consolidation of pleading 
doctrine that came with Iqbal97 may account for the apparent slight downward 
trend observed here.98 In sum, the resulting Twombly-Iqbal tighter pleading 
regime may have led federal plaintiffs to plead fewer causes of action, which 
would help explain why a post-Massachusetts regulatory claim-increasing 
effect never materialized.  
 Thus, the argument that Massachusetts operated a major change as far as 
climate change-related pleading is concerned requires some nuance. It may 
help explain why plaintiffs have consistently preferred pleading regulatory 
                                                                                                                                  
  97. As discussed supra note 39, Iqbal clarified remaining doubts regarding the Twombly 
pleading standard. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 544, 684. 
  98. A period of instability in pleading doctrine occurred between Twombly and Iqbal. Merely 
two weeks after Twombly, uncertainty mounted over the general applicability of the new pleading 
standard when the Court vacated a district court dismissal of a prisoner’s civil rights claim. See 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007). Without referring to any plausibility standard, the Court 
repeatedly cited Twombly for the proposition that “specific facts are not necessary,” implying that 
it stood for notice pleading. See id. at 93. While the low range of variability of the average number 
of causes of action per complaint and relatively small size of our dataset do not allow us to test 
statistically the effect of doctrinal instability, such instability may be a plausible explanation for 
the fluctuation that followed Twombly. For a discussion on the instability of pleading doctrine 
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causes of action to nonregulatory ones, a point we made following our discus-
sion on clustering. Yet, the conjecture that Massachusetts increased the num-
ber of regulatory causes of action per complaint cannot be corroborated. 
Rather, as discussed in Part II.A, it seems that overarching legal doctrines, 
such as standing and displacement—and possibly pleading—have constrained 
plaintiffs’ selection of causes of action.  
C. AEP and State Plaintiffs’ Pleading Strategy 
State court filings provide another way of testing whether plaintiffs have 
adjusted the content of their pleadings in response to shifts in climate change-
related precedent. One particular U.S. Supreme Court ruling, AEP, bears the 
most relevance to plaintiffs filing state law-based climate change-related 
claims. 99  In AEP, the Court held that plaintiffs’ (several state attorneys 
general) federal common law nuisance abatement claim based on defendants’ 
GHG emissions was displaced even before EPA had set emission standards.100 
The Court further noted: “The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA 
the decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from 
power plants; the delegation is what displaces federal common law.”101  
Thus conceived, displacement is inherently an issue of separation of 
powers, where evidence of congressional delegation is generally enough to 
take away judicial power to grant relief under federal common law. Of course, 
displacement also implicates the general post-Erie skepticism regarding 
federal court authority to deploy federal common law.102 This skepticism 
however, neither restrains plaintiffs’ ability to bring state common law causes 
of action before any court nor necessarily implies that such actions will be 
preempted.103 To such plaintiffs, so long as their state causes of action do not 
interfere with subjects within the national legislative power, they will not be 
preempted. Therefore, the displacement of federal common law in this area 
gives plaintiffs incentives to attempt other types of causes of action. Other 
things being equal, plaintiffs’ counsel may have reacted to AEP by pleading 
                                                                                                                                  
  99. Because the procedural law of most states tracks the Federal Rules, it is possible that 
federal precedent on pleading standards influences pleading doctrine at the state level. However, a 
relationship between Twombly and changes in pleading at the state level would be harder to detect 
as state law governs procedure, subject only to state constitutional law and to the outer limit set by 
the Federal Constitution’s 14th Amendment. See, e.g., Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 189 P.3d 
344, 348 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc) (retaining notice pleading and vacating the portion of the Arizona 
Court of Appeals’ opinion that cited Twombly).  
  100. See AEP v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2538 (2011) and discussion in supra Part 
II.A.  
  101. See AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2538.  
  102. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that federal courts 
entertaining state law-based claims cannot displace otherwise constitutionally valid state substan-
tive law to apply the “federal general common law” they might perceive as the better law). This 
skepticism, however, is suspended where “[t]he new federal common law addresses subjects 
within the national legislative power where Congress has so directed or where the basic scheme of 
the Constitution so demands.” AEP, 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (citation and quotations omitted).  
  103. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Co., 696 F.3d 849, 866 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(Pro, J., concurring).  
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more state common law causes of action (including state law-based torts), as 
described in Hypothesis 2 below:  
H2: Displacement of federal common law causes of action has led 
plaintiffs to plead more state common law causes of action, 
including torts.  
To test H2, we used only state-filed complaints to minimize the impact of 
federal-specific doctrines (for example, on pleading, and so forth).104 State-
filed complaints are not evenly distributed around the AEP ruling. Of 69 
complaints containing a total of 111 causes of action, 56 (81.16 percent) were 
filed before AEP was announced, the remaining 13 (18.84 percent) were filed 
after. That the Supreme Court decided AEP quite recently helps explain this 
uneveness and invites caution in interpreting results. Furthermore, the 
relatively small number of post-AEP complaints and low variation in the 
number of complaints that make up our data make it harder to corroborate H2.  
With these caveats in mind and in keeping with our methodology, we test 
this hypothesis by plotting the kernel density of the number of state common 
law causes of action (including torts) filed per complaint before and after AEP. 
Figure 8 shows that the pre-AEP distribution of the number of causes of action 
is concentrated between zero and one and a half per complaint. In contrast, 
complaints filed after AEP have a wider distribution, concentrated between 
zero and two. Post-AEP complaints also have a probability density curve that 
tails off more gradually as the number of causes of action increases, a possible 
indicator of a post-AEP increase in the number of state common law claims 
pled. Although pre- and post-AEP complaints have the same median number 
of causes of action, zero each, a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = 1.82; p < 0.05) 












                                                                                                                                  
  104. Of the six complaints containing state tort causes of action filed in federal courts, two 
came after AEP: the Kivalina and Comer complaints. See cases cited supra note 75. We did not 
include these six complaints in this test because we wanted to conduct an apples-to-apples com-
parison between pre- and post-AEP state court filings.  
  105. For an explanation of why the Wilcoxon test can produce statistically different rank 
sums, despite having equal medians, see FAQ: Why Is the Mann-Whitney Significant When the 
Medians Are Equal?, INST. FOR DIGITAL RESEARCH & EDUC. (IDRE)—UCLA, http://www.ats. 
ucla.edu/stat/mult_pkg/faq/general/mann-whitney.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2014).  
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Figure 8. Kernel Density Plot of the Number of Causes of Action  
per Complaint Following AEP 
 
 Although this result is preliminary due to the recency of AEP, it shows 
that post-AEP filed complaints do contain more state common law causes of 
action than before, the first indication in the literature that plaintiffs in climate 
change-related cases might be changing the content of their state court 
pleadings in response to a particular U.S. Supreme Court decision. Should this 
issue-area-specific finding be confirmed as additional data becomes available 
over time, it may alter the climate change litigation landscape currently 
dominated by federal filings. However, in light of the difficulty plaintiffs have 
had in overcoming threshold and merit-based challenges, such as preemption 
and causation, we remain skeptical of the possibility that state court activity 
will amount to much.  
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION’S MUTED EFFECT 
In this article, we used a new cause-of-action-based dataset constructed 
from complaints filed in state and federal courts. A subset of all climate 
change-related filings, these complaints share one thing in common: they were 
drafted by plaintiffs seeking to have courts impose damages or tighter controls 
on activities associated with GHG emissions. The defendants in these suits 
were not always major GHG emitters. Some were federal-state government 
agencies or local governments being urged to take mitigating action or stop 
taking action perceived as contributing to GHG emissions. Regardless, as 
filed, these complaints would invariably raise GHG emitters’ costs if they 
obtained relief authorized for the causes of actions pled.  
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We focused on potentially risk-increasing complaints because we wanted 
to test whether variable, potentially inconsistent and more costly litigation 
outcomes (court-imposed standards, injunctions, damage awards, and so forth) 
could induce at least a sufficient portion of GHG emitters to support action on 
climate legislation. After empirical testing, the results we found were surpris-
ing because they tell a consistent and perhaps (to some) boring story. Judging 
from the number, content and structure of risk-increasing complaints filed so 
far, state and federal climate change-related litigation occurs within the con-
fines of overarching legal doctrines that constrain filings mostly to regulatory 
pleadings due to the high barriers to recovery they impose on other forms of 
climate change-related litigation (for example, common law causes of action). 
Thus, the circumscribed nature and high frequency of regulatory pleadings are 
unlikely to produce the transformative outcomes that would justify a switch to 
preemptive federal legislation.  
This muted effect also extends to the U.S. Supreme Court’s two major 
rulings involving climate change: Massachusetts and AEP. Whereas the 
potential claim-increasing effect of Massachusetts never materialized—
perhaps partly due to the countervailing effect of Twombly’s tightening of 
federal pleading standards—AEP’s nod to state common law claims is of 
limited significance, because nuisance claims for emission abatement and 
claims for damages under state common law are increasingly likely to be 
perceived as threatening the overall purpose of EPA’s expanding GHG 
emission regulations. Whatever litigation advantage plaintiffs may gain by 
remaining in state court—assuming removal is not a possibility due to plaintiff 
willingness to limit their causes of action to state law claims—may be lost 
when they face a preemption challenge. All too frequently, state law-based 
climate change litigation may be viewed as a waste of resources. Indeed, state 
and federal plaintiffs pled regulatory claims 92.7 percent of the time.106  
 
While the liberal pleading philosophy behind the Federal Rules and the 
modern approach to claim preclusion may provide plaintiffs with strong 
incentives to join as many colorable claims as they may seem fit, generally 
applicable legal doctrine, pleading standards, and cues from the litigation 
environment do constrain their pleadings. Here, a study of pleading practice in 
the climate change-related area leads to the conclusion that generally 
applicable litigation doctrines—including standing, displacement, preemption, 
and perhaps tighter pleading standards—seem to be influencing pleading 
patterns, even subduing the impact of the two major U.S. Supreme Court 
rulings in this area. These findings indicate that this type of litigation has not, 
and is not likely to, induce major GHG emitters to support federal preemptive 
                                                                                                                                  
  106. See supra Table 3 and discussion infra Parts I.C.2, II.A. 
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emissions legislation as a risk-reducing compromise. Indeed, EPA’s expanding 
mitigation regulations, not state common law actions, are the bigger threat.107  
Considering the level of ideological opposition to and feigned support for 
carbon-restricting legislation in Congress, the absence of an anti-litigation 
incentive suggests that GHG emitters will not abandon direct or stealth 
legislative blockage. To the extent that the CAA (last amended in 1990) and 
other environmental statutes need refining amendments “to keep pace with 
science, technology and administrative practice,” blockage means the 
continuation of suboptimal policy. 108  Although the political system did 
overcome inherent opposition of special interests in the past, passing 
environmental statutes that created public goods,109 one is left to speculate 


















                                                                                                                                  
 107.  Although in its latest pronouncement under the CAA the Court struck down EPA’s 
claimed power to tailor expressly prescribed statutory numerical thresholds that would trigger 
GHG-specific permitting obligations for all covered stationary sources, the Court upheld EPA’s 
broad authority to require stationary sources that are already required to control emissions of 
conventional air pollutants (that is, large stationary sources) to also meet EPA-promulgated GHG-
emission thresholds. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency et al., 134 S. Ct. 2427, 
2446–47 (2014), aff’g in part, rev’g in part Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 
F.3d 102 (2012) (per curiam). While the decision that a source may not be subject to permitting 
requirements on the sole basis of its GHG emissions did curtail the scope of EPA power under the 
CAA, the Court itself recognized that, effectively, EPA’s authority to reach GHG emissions from 
stationary sources remains nearly intact. See e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2438–39 
(noting that EPA’s broad interpretation would account for 86 percent of U.S. stationary GHG 
emissions, but adding that limiting permit requirements to “anyway” sources would cover “rough-
ly 83 percent” of such emissions).  
  108. See Richard Lazarus, As Congress Stalls, the Courts Step In, 30 ENVTL. F. May–June 
2013 at 12.  
  109. See Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 59 (1992).  
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APPENDIX A. CAUSE OF ACTION  
CATEGORY REFERENCE TABLE 
 




Federal Agency Regulation 
 
F. Ag. Reg. 
 
F. Ag. Reg. 
 
Plaintiff alleges agen-
cy violation of its own 
regulations 
Federal Administrative 
Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 
Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
570a (2011)) 
F. APA APA Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of the general 
federal agency proce-
dural statute 
Federal Clean Air Act, ch. 
360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) 
(codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q 
(2011)) 
F. CAA CAA Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of federal air 
quality statute 
Federal Clean Water Act, ch. 
758, 86 Stat. 816 (1948) 
(codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2011)) 
F. CWA CWA Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of federal water 
quality statute 
Federal Endangered Species 
Act of 1973, ch. 35, 87 Stat. 
884 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 
(2011)) 
F. ESA ESA Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of federal endan-
gered species 
protection statute 
Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, ch. 
35, 90 Stat. 2743  (codified as 
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 
1701-1787 (2011)) 
FLPMA FLPMA Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of federal land 
usage regulation 
Federal Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, ch. 5, 80 Stat. 
250 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-
559 (2011)) 
F. FOIA FOIA Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of federal trans-
parency statute 
Federal National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969, 
ch. 55, 83 Stat. 852 (codified 
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
4331-4370h (2011)) 
F. NEPA NEPA Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of federal envi-
ronmental protection 
statute 
Federal National Historic 
Preservation Act, ch. 1A, 80 
Stat. 915 (1966) (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470-
470x–6 (2011)) 
F. NHPA NHPA Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of federal histori-
cal protection statute 
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Plaintiff alleges civil 
wrongdoing under 
federal common law 
Other federal nonregulatory Other F. Non-
Reg. 
O. F. Non-Reg. Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of federal consti-
tution, federal 
conspiracy, concert of 
action, or RICO 
statutes 
Other federal regulatory Other F. Reg. O. F. Obs. Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of less common 
federal regulatory 
statutes (i.e., less than 




S. Adm. Proc. S. Adm. Proc. Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of state adminis-
trative procedure 







S. NEPA S. NEPA Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of state environ-
mental protection 
statute (e.g., California 
Environmental Quality 
Act, Minnesota Envi-
ronmental Policy Act) 
State tort S. Tort S. Tort Plaintiff alleges civil 
wrongdoing under 
state common law 
State water statute S. Water Stat. SWS Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of state water 
quality statute (e.g., 
California Water 
Code, Texas Water 
Code, etc.) 
State zoning S. Zoning S. Zoning Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of state zoning 
laws, codes, etc. 
    
 
Other state common law 
 
Other S. C-L 
 
 
O. S. C-L 
 
Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of state common 
law other than state 
Colares & Ristovski 
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Other state nonregulatory Other S. Non-
Reg. 
O. S. Non-Reg. Plaintiff alleges viola-
tion of state constitu-
tion or state 
conspiracy, concert of 
action, or RICO statute 
 
Other state regulatory Other S. Reg. O. S. Obs. Plaintiff alleges viola-
tions of less common 
state regulatory stat-
utes (i.e., less than five 
challenges per given 
statute) 
    
























 Pleading Patterns and the Role of Litigation 
 
 
SUMMER 2014 373 
APPENDIX B. A t-TEST  
FOR CAUSE-OF-ACTION CO-OCCURRENCE 
 
We think of the set of 178 complaints as containing a sequence of pairs of 
two particular causes of action: CoAi and CoAj. Thus conceived, complaints 
are random variables that take on the value 1 when the pair CoAi-CoAj occurs 
in the complaint, and 0, otherwise. We calculate the probability of occurrence 
for each CoAi and CoAj as the ratio of their frequency of occurrence to the 
total number of complaints: 
 
P(CoAi) =  f(CoAi) / N; and  
 
P(CoAj) =  f(CoAj) / N 
 
The null hypothesis states that occurrences of CoAi and CoAj are inde-
pendent. The research hypothesis posits the opposite. 
 
H0: P(CoAi, CoAj) = P(CoAi)*P(CoAj) = [f(CoAi)*f(CoAj)] / N2 
 
The process of randomly generating pairs of causes of action—assigning 
1 to the complaint where CoAi and CoAj co-occur and 0 to all other com-
plaints—is in effect a Bernoulli trial with probability P(CoAi, CoAj) = 
[f(CoAi)* f(CoAj)] / N2. The mean of this distribution is µ= P(CoAi, CoAj) = 
[f(CoAi)* f(CoAj)] / N2 and variance σ2= P(CoAi, CoAj) * (1- P(CoAi, CoAj)). 
 
The sample mean, calculated as the ratio of complaints in which the pair 
CoAi-CoAj occurs to the total number of complaints, is obtained by:  
 
 f(COAi, COAj) / N 
 
The sample variance is: 
 
s2= (1- ). 
 




For purposes of significance testing, we compare the calculated t to the 
critical t-value (one-tailed test), with n-1 degrees of freedom (i.e., df = 177). 
For example, the critical t-value for a 95% confidence level equals 1.653. 
=x
x x
Ns
xt
2
µ−
=
